25 years of mass surveillance is enough
A Quarter Century of Mass Surveillance: Time to Stop
Originally co-authored with Cindy Cohn and published via Lawfare.
The fundamental nature of government oversight underwent a seismic shift approximately 25 years ago. We moved from targeted surveillance—where specific individuals were monitored via wiretaps or "pen register" orders—to mass surveillance, which involves the indiscriminate harvesting of data from the internet's backbone and the bulk collection of digital metadata.
The Evolution of the Surveillance State
What began as a purported shield against terrorism has morphed into a standard operating procedure for general law enforcement. The scope has expanded far beyond "national security."
- Immigration & Dissent: ICE utilizes these tools for deportation efforts and to monitor citizens exercising their First Amendment right to protest.
- Private Sector Integration: Mass surveillance is now embedded in commercial security. Examples include:
- Facial recognition systems at venues like
Madison Square Garden. Flocklicense plate readers deployed across highways and parking lots.
- Facial recognition systems at venues like
The Symbiosis of Public and Private Spying
There is a dangerous feedback loop between corporate "surveillance capitalism" and state power. The internet's primary business model is surveillance; giants like Google and Facebook track every user movement. The government simply plugs into this existing stream.
| Entity | Source of Data | Method of Acquisition |
|---|---|---|
| NSA | Telecoms/ISPs | Direct backbone tapping / Partnerships |
| Local Police | Private ALPRs | Commercial contracts (e.g., Flock) |
| ICE/FBI | Data Brokers | Direct purchase of location/behavioral data |
Legal warrants are always required. In reality, the FBI (as confirmed by Director Kash Patel in congressional testimony) simply purchases American data from brokers to bypass traditional legal hurdles.
The "Know It All" Philosophy
Following the trauma of 9/11, a narrative emerged: to be safe, the government must see everything. The fear that a threat could be anyone, anywhere, justified watching everyone, everywhere.
This logic was captured in an internal NSA presentation leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013. The goal was a total information vacuum:
"Collect it All" "Process it All" "Exploit it All" "Partner it All" "Sniff it All" "Know it All."
This same rationale now drives domestic policing: the belief that total visibility equals total crime prevention.
The Missing Calculus
Despite the massive investment, there has been no rigorous analysis of the actual efficacy of these programs. We lack a transparent equation for the cost-benefit ratio:
While the NSA occasionally cites "success stories" when under public scrutiny, these claims often evaporate upon closer inspection. Similarly, companies like Flock conflate "database hits" with "crimes solved," providing dubious data rather than empirical proof of increased safety.
The Legal Trajectory
The transition to mass surveillance was marked by a series of legal pivots and secret interpretations:
- Post-9/11: Initiation of the "President's Surveillance Program" based on raw executive power.
- 2006: Secret shift to a broad interpretation of Section 215 of the Patriot Act to justify bulk phone record collection.
- 2013: Edward Snowden reveals the scale of the domestic spying apparatus.
- 2015: The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rules that Section 215 did not authorize indiscriminate mass collection.
- Ongoing: The "Upstream" program continues to intercept content and metadata via Section 702 of FISA.

Conclusion
As AI enhances the ability to analyze vast datasets, the risks associated with mass surveillance only intensify. After twenty-five years, it is time to acknowledge that the "collect it all" mentality is not a security strategy—it is a fundamental threat to a free society.
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#Privacy #CivilLiberties #MassSurveillance #DigitalRights